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Declaring Crimes 
Chloë Kennedy  
Abstract: For centuries, Scots criminal law has been renowned for its flexibility and 
adaptability. One striking example of this characteristic is the so-called declaratory 
power: the power of Scotland’s highest criminal court to declare conduct punishable 
in the absence of statutory authority or direct precedent. This article considers the 
origins and early use of the declaratory power in light of some of the questions that 
occupied key thinkers in Enlightenment Scotland to show how, in contrast to its 
contemporary opprobrium, the power might once have appeared unobjectionable. It 
then considers some more recent examples of judicial lawmaking in Scots criminal 
law and suggests that this nuanced historical understanding casts them in a potentially 
more favourable light. Beyond their relevance to Scots law, these observations 
resonate with more general debates about the requirements of legality, legal authority, 
the limits of judicial discretion and the relationship between laws and the community.  
 
Keywords: criminal law, legal history, common law, authority, legitimacy, judicial 
discretion 
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1. Introduction 
 
Suppose a person were to ask this question – What part of Europe is it where a court 
of law claims, and, in virtue of its own decision, actually exercises, the power of 
declaring any action it thinks proper to be a crime; and of applying whatever 
punishment it deems expedient to the new offences thus judicially introduced? Would 
he not be considered a conceited fellow, who was stating a conundrum, to which he 
knew that, in the plain meaning of the words, there was no answer? But, 
unfortunately, there is an answer. The place is Scotland. 
(Henry Cockburn, 1846)1 
 
One of the distinctive features of Scots law is its extensive and malleable body of 
common law crimes.2 Both individually and collectively, common law crimes in 
Scotland have traditionally been regarded as possessing an inherent flexibility that 
allows for swift adaptation to the changing needs of the community as they arise. A 
particularly striking example of this characteristic is the so-called declaratory power 
of the High Court of Justiciary: the ability of Scotland’s highest criminal court 
‘competently to punish, (with the exception of life and limb), every act which is 
obviously of a criminal nature; though it be such which in time past has never been 
                                                 
1 ‘Scottish Criminal Jurisprudence and Procedure’ (1846) 83 Edinburgh Review 196, 
210. 
2 While judicial creativity is not exclusive to the Scottish High Court, the degree to 
which it is acknowledged is idiosyncratic (Alexander Nikolaevich Shytov, 
Conscience and Love in Making Judicial Decisions (Springer 2001) 168). Irrespective 
of its accuracy, the claim of distinctiveness came to be an important dimension of the 
perception and self-understanding of Scots criminal law (see, for example, J Scott 
(ed), ‘Observations on Some Distinctions Between the English and Scottish Systems 
of Law’ (1820) 1(4) London Magazine 408, 409 and J F Waller (ed), ‘The Criminal 
Jurisprudence of Scotland’ (1847) 29 Dublin University Magazine 391, 394). 
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the subject of prosecution’.3 Unsurprisingly, this power has long attracted criticism on 
rule of law grounds.4 Indeed, despite having rarely been invoked explicitly since its 
emergence at the end of the eighteenth century, and notwithstanding the claim that ‘its 
exercise today is unthinkable’,5 the power continues to vex its detractors.6 For 
example, when delivering the 2013 Annual Lecture of the Society of Solicitors in the 
Supreme Court, the Lord President, Lord Gill, warned of the ‘perils of judge-made 
law’, suggesting that it was time to ‘lay the declaratory power to rest’. 7 
 The main criticisms laid against the declaratory power are that it flouts the 
desiderata of legal certainty, accessibility and non-retroactivity8 and that it enables a 
small number of judges to decide what the law should be.9 To modern eyes, these 
complaints appear incontrovertible. Assessed against mainstream contemporary 
expectations, the declaratory power can seem to sanction unfettered judicial discretion 
and allow for the arbitrary and illegitimate extension of the criminal law. This point is 
exacerbated by the fact that, despite having received considerable attention, no full 
                                                 
3 David Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting the Description and 
Punishment of Crimes, (Bell & Bradfute 1797 vol 1) lii. 
4 Especially in light of the prohibition of retrospective criminalization, as enshrined 
by Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (see Jonathan Burchell 
and Christopher Gane, ‘Shamelessness Scotched: the Domain of Decency after 
Dominick’ (2004) Edin LR 231; I D Willock, ‘The Declaratory Power – Still 
Indefensible’ 1996 Jur Rev 97; M G A Christie, ‘Criminal Law’ The Laws of 
Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (Reissue, 2005) paras 1, 15). 
5 M G A Christie, ‘Criminal Law’ (n 4) para 15. 
6 There have been occasional champions of the power e.g. S Styles, ‘The Declaratory 
Power: Inevitable and Desirable’ 1999 Jur Rev 99 and S Styles, ‘Something to 
Declare: A Defence of the Declaratory Power of the High Court of Justiciary’ in R F 
Hunter (ed), Justice and Crime (T & T Clark 1993). For more qualified endorsement 
of the flexibility of Scots criminal law see T H Jones, ‘Common Law and Criminal 
Law: the Scottish example’ [1990] Crim LR 292.  
7 Scottish Legal News, December 2013 (obtained from publication's records). 
8 T H Jones and M G A Christie, Criminal Law (6th edn, W Green 2015) para 2-20. 
9 Scottish Legal News (n7). 
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historical understanding of the declaratory power has been forthcoming. 10 As a 
consequence, within contemporary scholarship the declaratory power tends to feature 
not only as a source of disdain but also confusion. As two commentators have 
recently remarked, ‘[i]t seems…not particularly clear why the High Court ever had, or 
claimed to have, such a power’,11 adding that ‘former attempts by the High Court to 
formulate new types of criminal behaviour by exercise of the power do little to 
answer the general question why certain conduct deserves to be stigmatised as 
criminal at all’.12 
 With no clear sense of the power’s emergence and rationalization it is perhaps 
inevitable that it is generally reviled and considered mysterious today. Deprived of an 
understanding of the framework of thought within which it emanated, it is 
unsurprising that we should remain blind to alternative evaluations. Yet, as this article 
aims to show, through a deep appreciation of the power’s origins and early use, 
informed by the intellectual climate in which it emerged, the power can be seen not 
only to have made sense, but also to have been considered potentially justifiable. 
Indeed, through recovering the body of philosophical thought that appears to have 
buttressed early understandings of the power – drawn from the works of Lord Kames, 
David Hume, Adam Smith and Dugald Stewart – it becomes clear that this form of 
judicial lawmaking was not necessarily as unconstrained as it might first appear. 
 The very nature of the declaratory power precludes the possibility that either 
legislation or previous cases might guide or restrain courts in its exercise but, at the 
time of its emergence, alternative limitations to judicial discretion existed in the form 
                                                 
10 For a doctrinal history of the power see M G A Christie (ed), Criminal Law of 
Scotland (3rd edn, Green 2000-2001) paras 1.30-1.42 and Criminal Law (n8) paras 2-
20-2-33. 
11 Criminal Law (n8) para 2-24. 
12 ibid para 2-33. 
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of a divide between justice and expediency that was prevalent in philosophical 
writing. 13 Whereas courts were considered unfit to decide issues of expediency (or 
utility, as it was sometimes called), they were thought well-suited to determining 
issues of justice. By adhering to the dictates of justice, the High Court might therefore 
attain the certainty, authority and legitimacy that could render exercise of the power 
justifiable. 
 In this way, the explanation of the declaratory power offered here contributes, 
in a jurisdictionally specific manner, toward more general debates about the often-
maligned declaratory theory of law. The declaratory theory of law, which states that 
judges do not make law but only declare what it has always been, is considered by 
many to be an absurd fiction, but, as Beever has argued, it can make sense, and indeed 
can be seen to accord with contemporary judicial practice, when ‘law’ is understood 
to encompass more than legislation and decided cases.14 In the case of the declaratory 
power, this ‘something more’ was a sense of justice that was grounded in prevailing 
philosophical theories of morality, which were in turn rooted in the common 
sentiments, or common sense, of mankind. Despite endorsing a higher degree of 
novelty than the declaratory theory typically accommodates, the declaratory power 
therefore represents a distinctive example of the more general idea that courts might 
decide cases in accordance with law, whilst nevertheless departing from, or having no 
recourse to, posited law. 
 Throughout the nineteenth century, however, both Scots and English law 
moved towards the principle of stare decisis, 15 and growing disdain for judge-made 
                                                 
13 Discussed in section 4. 
14 Allan Beever, ‘The Declaratory Theory of Law’ (2013) 33(3) OJLS 421. 
15 G Maher, ‘Judicial Precedent’ The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia (1986) paras 251-252. 
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law and increased concern with observing the separation of powers16 contributed to an 
intellectual climate in which the declaratory power increasingly began to attract 
disapproval. This disapprobation set the tone for the modern law’s development, 
which is characterized by the combination of a more restrained, though still 
controversial, reliance on general principles and judicial adaptation of the law to 
reflect societal changes. Despite their peculiarities, these approaches share some 
important similarities with the declaratory power. In fact, as I suggest below, these 
two forms of judicial discretion represent the cleaving apart of two dimensions of the 
declaratory power that were previously unified: the notion that law incorporates more 
than decided cases and legislation and the idea that law depends for its legitimacy on 
a close association with the community. 
 The reliance on general principles amounts to a more contemporary iteration 
of the declaratory theory of law, which concedes the necessity of drawing on existing 
legal authority while preserving a conception of law that extends beyond legislation 
and decided cases. According to leading theories adjudication, such as Dworkin’s 
theory of interpretation17 and some of its derivatives, this form of judicial lawmaking 
might be considered justifiable, thereby further exonerating the declaratory theory of 
law. By contrast, once shorn of its former philosophical underpinnings, the assertion 
that judges ought to innovate to meet the needs of the community is less easily 
characterized as an instantiation of the declaratory theory. Instead, this form of 
judicial lawmaking draws explicitly on extra-legal, policy considerations. Whilst this 
                                                 
16 E.g. Samuel Romilley, ‘Papers Relative to Codification, and Public Instruction, 
including Correspondences with the Russian Emperor, and divers Constituted 
Authorities in the American United States. Published by Jeremy Bentham’ (1817) 29 
Edinburgh Review 217; ‘On the Legislative, Judicial and Executive Powers’ (1830) 2 
The Law Chronicle 72. 
17 For a discussion of Dworkin’s theory of interpretation, the declaratory theory of 
law and common law development see Peter Jaffey, ‘Authority in the Common Law’ 
(2011) 36 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1. 
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might appear illegitimate according to a practice-based model of common law 
authority, which requires that law be developed on the basis of existing legal 
authorities, it coheres well with a custom-based model of common law authority, 
according to which judicial lawmaking is legitimate insofar as it corresponds to the 
prevailing norms of the community.18  
 A close examination of the declaratory power’s early use and origins can 
therefore explain and potentially vindicate both older and more recent examples of the 
commitment to flexibility within Scots criminal law. More generally, it provides a 
clear demonstration of the fact that there are multiple ways of conceiving of 
legitimacy and legality, and a stark reminder that failure to acknowledge this point is 
liable to give rise to unwarranted, because misguided, criticism. In short, its 
significance exceeds both its temporal and jurisdictional bounds. 
 
2. The Study and Its Method 
 
Those familiar with Scottish legal history might doubt the need to probe any further 
into the origins of the declaratory power.  Existing research has shown that the power 
proved a useful resource at a time when Scotland lacked its own parliament and 
supplied powerful evidence of the purported ‘native vigour’ of the Scottish legal 
tradition.19 In addition, the political affiliations (and personal animosity) of important 
figures in the history of the declaratory power can help explain how it was used and 
                                                 
18 On these models of authority see Dan Priel, ‘Conceptions of Authority and the 
Anglo-American Common Law Divide’ forthcoming American Journal of 
Comparative Law.  
19 Lindsay Farmer, ‘“The Genius of Our Law…”: Criminal Law and the Scottish 
Legal Tradition’ (1992) 55(1) MLR 25. Poor parliamentary representation of Scotland 
was also a concern during the nineteenth century (H T Cockburn ‘Parliamentary 
Representation of Scotland’ (1830) 52 Edinburgh Review 208). 
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regarded. Baron Hume, a conservative High Tory whose statement on the declaratory 
power is sometimes taken to be its genesis,20 emphasized the merits of Scots criminal 
law, including the power, in his highly authoritative Commentaries on the Law of 
Scotland Respecting the Description and Punishment of Crimes.21 One of his 
motivations for writing the text was to ‘[rescue] the law of my native country from 
that state of declension in the esteem of some part of the public, into which, of late 
years it seems to have been falling’,22 an aim to which the Whig reformist Henry 
Cockburn attributed a desire to vindicate the infamous sedition trials of the 1790s.23 
Cockburn himself was a vocal critic of both the declaratory power24 and what he saw 
as Hume’s uncritical reverence for defects in the Scottish legal system.25 However, 
although these political factors shed significant light on the existence, use and 
reception of the declaratory power, they are unable to explain how the declaratory 
power made sense: how it might have appeared innocuous and for what reasons. 
 As the following sections demonstrate, such an explanation depends on 
resuscitating the ideas and assumptions that underpinned the declaratory power and 
placing them in their wider intellectual context. In order to do this, this article 
examines Hume’s description of the power and a selection of ‘informations’ – written 
                                                 
20 M G A Christie, ‘Criminal Law’ (n 4) para 6; R Shiels, ‘The Declaratory Power and 
the Abolition of the Syllogism’ 2010 SCL 1, 4 (both referring to this impression). 
21 Hume (n 3) lii-liii. Hume’s Commentaries continue to be an important source of 
Scots criminal law (M G A Christie, ‘Criminal Law’ (n 4) para 2). 
22 Hume (n 3) xli. 
23 Jim Smyth and Alan McKinlay, ‘Whigs, Tories and Scottish Legal Reform, c. 
1785-1832’ (2011) 15(1) Crime History and Societies 111, 124. 
24 E.g. H T Cockburn, ‘Remarks on the Administration of Criminal Justice in 
Scotland, and the Changes Proposed to be Introduced into it’ (1825) 41 Edinburgh 
Review 450, 460-461. 
25 E.g. Cockburn ‘Scottish Criminal Jurisprudence’ (n 1) 198, 200-201. 
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arguments26 submitted by advocates, at the request of the court, when difficult 
questions of law or relevancy arose27 – taken from cases where the High Court’s 
creative power was in play. Few details survive28 in respect of cases that occurred 
prior to the advent of serial case reporting in 1819,29 so these informations are 
valuable, and underexplored, sources for this period. Furthermore, comprising 
detailed accounts of the arguments practitioners deemed appropriate (and presumably 
persuasive) when making their case to the court, they offer meaningful insight into 
how the declaratory power was understood at this time. 
 The cases discussed were chosen for their significance in understanding the 
origins and early use of the declaratory power. Pinpointing the precise origins of the 
power is challenging, for it is questionable how far the examples Hume provides 
when first describing the power30 – of sending threatening letters31 and altering 
promissory notes32 – support its existence. According to the informations pertaining 
to the latter case, the main defence argument was that there had been no falsehood 
and forgery because the acts charged were committed in error and the pursuers had 
suffered no injury.33 From this, it is unclear whether the court exercised the 
                                                 
26 Contained in the High Court of Justiciary Books of Adjournal and Minute Books, 
the most detailed records of the court’s proceedings preserved by National Records of 
Scotland. 
27 William Bell, A Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland, with Short 
Explanations of the Most Ordinary English Law Terms (Bell & Bradfute 1839) 444. 
28 Neither the Books of Adjournal nor Minute Books I have examined contain records 
of judicial opinions. Hume’s Commentaries, which were based on an examination of 
the Books of Adjournal, offer only short statements of the principles derived from 
each case (D M Walker, A Legal History of Scotland, vol 5 (T & T Clark 1998) 17. 
29 Although serial reporting commenced at this time, unbroken coverage only began 
in 1835 (D M Walker, A Legal History of Scotland, vol 6 (Butterworths LexisNexis 
2001) 9).  
30 Hume (n 3) lii. Hume’s Commentaries is considered the first legal text to have 
mentioned the power (Cockburn ‘Scottish Criminal Jurisprudence’ (n 1) 216-217). 
31 James Gray 27 June 1737 (Hume (n 3) vol 2) 278). 
32 Thomas Mathie 10 March 1727 (Hume (n 3) 228). 
33 NRS JC 7/14. 
 10 
declaratory power in holding the libel relevant and subsequently inflicting 
punishment. As for sending threatening letters, which has more often been cited as 
evidence of the Court’s power,34 this was arguably criminal prior to the alleged 
exercise of the Court’s inherent power.35 Indeed, counsel for the accused admitted as 
much.36 
 Hume’s description of the power is more obviously supported by the 
judgments in the 1794 trial of Charles Sinclair for sedition.37 Though charges of 
sedition had previously been held relevant,38 Sinclair was the first trial at which 
counsel were present to make objections on behalf of the accused. Significantly, the 
question of whether sedition was a crime at common law was not in contention; even 
defence counsel accepted that it was.39 The issue to be decided was whether various 
statutes pertaining to sedition had abrogated the common law, thereby limiting the 
punishment that might be imposed. Notwithstanding this, the Court chose to proclaim 
its ability to ‘punish every offence that can be denominated a crime on the principles 
of sound reason and morality’.40 
 In Cockburn’s view, the court had no warrant for assuming this ‘extraordinary 
authority’,41 but according to their Lordships it had been ‘recognized in a variety of 
                                                 
34 E.g. Lord Moncreiff in Greenhuff (1838) 2 Swin 236, 265. 
35 Cockburn, ‘Scottish Criminal Jurisprudence’ (n 1) 217. 
36 NRS JC 7/21. His argument was that the conduct could not infer capital 
punishment. 
37 Hume affirms the court’s power using similar terminology to the judges, though he 
does not cite the case (Hume (n 3) vol 2) 487). 
38 See Henry Cockburn, An Examination of the Trials for Sedition which have 
Hitherto Occurred in Scotland (David Douglas 1888). 
39 Thomas Jones Howell, A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for 
High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors, vol 23 (T C Hansard 1817) 790. 
40 Lord Abercrombie (ibid 798)). Lord Esgrove and Lord Justice-Clerk Braxfield 
made comments to the same effect (ibid 795-796, 799). 
41 Cockburn, ‘Examination of the Trials for Sedition’ ((n 38) vol 2) 37. 
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instances’.42 Just one example was given, however: the 1751 case of Thomas Gray 
and others.43 In this case, the charge of forcible marriage was contested on the 
grounds that there was no such crime by the law of Scotland and that no one ought to 
be punished for doing that which neither the law of nature nor the law of his country 
had prohibited.44 The prosecutor considered this argument too extravagant to require 
confutation, focussing instead on the degree of punishment that could be imposed. In 
doing so, however, he admitted there was neither statute nor precedent to support his 
case, arguing that just as the established common law crimes were first punished 
without precedent, it remained open to the court to punish previously unchecked 
conduct.45  
 This argument illustrates the difficulty in identifying cases where the 
declaratory power was implicated: what appears to be a discussion about the 
permissible degree of punishment turns into a debate over the Court’s capacity to 
punish new offences. For this reason, and as Farmer has argued, it is useful to 
consider the declaratory power as part of a broader system that emphasizes 
flexibility.46 With this in mind, the informations discussed here are not limited to 
cases where the declaratory power was actually exercised. There are few instances 
where the power has unequivocally been used;47 indeed, in the early period 
considered here, the only clear example is the punishment of workmen for combining 
                                                 
42 Lord Justice-Clerk Braxfield (Howell (n 39) 799). 
43 Lord Abercrombie (ibid 798). 
44 NRS JC 7/38.  
45 The libel was held relevant to infer arbitrary punishment and the accused were 
banished for fourteen years. 
46 Farmer (n 19) 28.  
47 See Farmer (n 19), referring to the High Court’s more recent practice. 
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to raise their wages.48 Yet arguments about the potential use of the power are 
important in determining how it was understood, so the two previous instances where 
similar prosecutions were attempted unsuccessfully have also been considered.49 For 
the same reason, Rachel Wright,50 which involved a charge of child stealing, has also 
been included. The case did not definitively involve exercise of the declaratory 
power, but the power was certainly mentioned and approved.51 
 In the interests of uncovering how the Court’s creative power was understood, 
two cases where bribery legislation cast doubt on the parameters of the common law 
are also discussed.52 Reflecting the proliferation of penal legislation in the eighteenth 
century,53 other cases concerning the relationship between such legislation and 
common law crimes arose, but from a survey of these54 the bribery cases emerge as 
particularly suitable for discussion because their charges were suspected of attempting 
to extend a statutory offence into an area whose criminality at common law was 
dubitable55 and because informations are available.56 
                                                 
48 William Mackimmie & others 12 and 13 March 1813 (David Hume, Commentaries 
on the Law of Scotland Respecting Crimes: with a supplement by Benjamin Robert 
Bell (Bell & Bradfute 1844) 495). 
49 James Taylor & others 12 May and 19 October 1808 and Chalmers, MacDonald & 
others January 11 1811 (ibid 494-495). 
50 23 November 1808 (ibid 84). 
51 See Greenhuff (n 34), where Lord Meadowbank describes the court in Wright as 
having acknowledged and acted upon the power (263) but Lord Cockburn describes it 
has having alluded to and assumed the existence of the power (276). 
52 McIntosh v Dempster July 1751 and James Stein 19 August, 7 November, 4 and 5 
December (Hume (n48) 408).  
53 David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined (CUP 1989) ch 10. 
54 Conducted through a search of the final edition of Hume’s Commentaries (n 48). 
55 Cf Brown and MacNab, 11 January 1793 (Hume (n 48) 169, NRS JC 3/46), where 
the main question was whether legislation pertaining to starch duty fraud had 
abrogated the common law of forgery and falsehood and Thomas Hall, July 20 1789 
(Hume (n 48) 172, NRS JC 3/45), where the main question was whether penal 
legislation concerning obtaining goods by false pretences extended to Scotland. 
56 Cf Caithness and Bissett, 1 December 1788 (Hume (n 48) 492, NRS JC 3/45), 
concerning a charge of assaulting a revenue officer, and Adam Johnstone, 25 
September 1780 and Daniel Mackay, 6 July 1781 (Hume (n 48) 67, NRS JC 12/16, 
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 Chronologically, the cases discussed fall between 1767 and 1827, a period 
during which the sources relied upon in criminal cases were changing. By the end of 
the eighteenth century, the longstanding practice of founding libels on the law of God 
and the Civil Law, both sources drawn upon in Thomas Gray, was starting to wane.57 
Additionally, though natural law, which had prevailed during the late seventeenth 
century into the first half of the eighteenth century, remained important, new theories 
of judgment based on the moral sense and sentiments appeared during the course of 
the eighteenth century.58 By situating the informations within the context of this shift, 
I show how these theories of judgment, which formed the basis of justice, provided a 
foundation for the common law at a time when its earlier sources were losing 
authority and its relationship with legislation demanded increasing attention.59 
 At this time, philosophy held an important place in Scottish public life, so it is 
natural that these theories should be manifest within legal practice. Men seeking to 
improve themselves perused philosophical works60 and metaphysical and moral 
                                                                                                                                           
NRS JC 7/41), concerning post-office employees stealing from the mail, for which 
only brief notes on the libel’s relevancy are recorded.  
57 Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting Trial for Crimes (Bell & 
Bradfute 1800 vol 1) 264. 
58 John W Cairns, Law, Lawyers and Humanism: Selected Essays on the History of 
Scots Law (Edinburgh University Press 2015 vol 1) xix. 
59 Changes in the meaning of ‘common law’ also reflect these shifts. As early as the 
late seventeenth century, Viscount Stair argued that the distinction between statutes, 
common law and recent custom could be applied to Scots law, but recognized that the 
name was sometimes given to ‘Equity, which is common to all Nations; or the Civil 
Roman Law, which in some sort is common to very many’ (quoted in J D Ford, Law 
and Opinion in Scotland During the Eighteenth Century (Hart 2007) 427). With a 
note of frustration, one early nineteenth century commentator remarked that almost all 
writers had differing notions of common law, adding that the distinction between 
common law and statute was recent (‘On the Sources of Scots Law, and the Rules of 
its Constitution’ (1829) 1 The Scots Law Chronicle 259, 259). 
60 James A Harris (ed) The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth 
Century (OUP 2013) 4. 
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philosophy was a central part of a Scottish university education.61 More specifically, 
it was common for law students to attend lectures delivered by philosophers at their 
chosen institutions62 and legal teaching had a distinctly jurisprudential bent.63 Even 
advocates who did not attend university were likely to have become familiar with 
prominent philosophical ideas, either through their desire to cultivate a civilized mind 
or because, from the middle of the eighteenth century, the Faculty of Advocates 
regarded candidates with a broad, liberal education as increasingly desirable.64 These 
factors all support the argument that the meaning of justice advanced by Scottish 
Enlightenment philosophers and other tenets of their thought, including the 
relationship between universals and particulars, and the nature of societal progress, 
help explain how the court’s creative powers could appear both unexceptionable and 
justifiable.65 
 
3. Universals, Particulars and Societal Progress 
 
A. The Perils of Speculation 
                                                 
61 George Elder Davie, The Democratic Intellect: Scotland and her Universities in the 
Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh University Press 1961) 7. 
62 David M Walker, The Scottish Jurists (W Green 1985) 282, 294. 
63 Certainly this is true of the University of Glasgow, where Professor John Millar 
adopted a Smithian approach in his teaching. Smithian influences are also detectable 
amongst Edinburgh Law Professors of the late eighteenth century (see John W Cairns 
‘The Legacy of Smith’s Jurisprudence in Late-Eighteenth Century Edinburgh’ 
(forthcoming)). 
64 John W Cairns, ‘The Formation of the Scottish Legal Mind in the Eighteenth 
Century: Themes of Humanism and Enlightenment in the Admission of Advocates’ in 
Neil MacCormick and Peter Birks (eds) The Legal Mind: Essays for Tony Honoré 
(Clarendon Press 1986) 253. 
65 The link between Scottish Enlightenment philosophy and the declaratory power has 
not been properly explored. Rahmatian makes a cursory comparison between the 
power, as he understands it, and Kames’ idea of moral sense but does not develop the 
point, concluding that ‘no influence can be suggested’ (Andreas Rahmatian, Lord 
Kames: Legal and Social Theorist (Edinburgh University Press 2015) 309-311). 
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To begin understanding the declaratory power it is necessary to consider its 
description by Hume, for although the judgments in Sinclair mean it is implausible to 
describe Hume as having created the power, his role in documenting and championing 
it cannot be ignored,66 particularly as his account is now considered authoritative. 67 
On first reading, it may seem unlikely that Hume’s Commentaries would disclose any 
philosophical commitments with which to contextualize his statement and 
endorsement of the power. In the book’s introduction, Hume clearly states that he had 
‘no intention of bringing forward a Philosophical Treatise of Criminal Jurisprudence’ 
or to ascertain the nature of specific offences or the application and proportion of 
punishments on ‘abstract and universal principles’.68 Rather, his aim was to set out the 
criminal law of Scotland as it stood.69 As John Cairns has remarked, these comments 
suggest that the Enlightenment synthesis of Scots criminal law with moral philosophy 
that Hume’s teacher John Millar had achieved was ‘sundered by his pupil, who 
explicitly distinguished the provinces of the lawyer and the philosopher’.70  
                                                 
66 As Cockburn expressed it, ‘[w]hatever the root of this principle may have been, the 
first known public fruit that it bore, was in the trials of 1793 and 1794; and this was 
the fruit that Hume so carefully gathered and preserved…’ (Cockburn ‘Scottish 
Criminal Jurisprudence’ (n 1) 217). 
67 Farmer (n 19) 26.  
68 Hume (n 3) lv, 3. Hume’s uncle the philosopher David Hume shared a similar view 
of the effort to conjoin Scots law and abstract philosophical principles, stating in a 
letter to Lord Kames that ‘[a] man might as well think of making a fine sauce by a 
Mixture of Wormwood & Aloes as an agreeable Composition by joining Metaphysics 
& Scotch Law’ (Raymond Klibansky and Ernest C Mossner (eds) New Letters of 
David Hume (Clarendon Press 1954) 52). 
69 Hume (n 3) lv. 
70 John W Cairns, ‘John Millar’s Lectures on Scots Criminal Law’ 8(3) (1988) OJLS 
364, 400.  
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 Rather than rejecting a union of philosophy and law altogether, 71 however, 
Hume appears merely to have been rejecting the deployment of one type of 
philosophical thinking. In the lectures he delivered while Professor of Scots law at the 
University of Edinburgh, Hume informed his students that a proper understanding of 
the law of any country required that close attention be paid to its specificities, adding 
that they ought to keep their ‘subtile reasoning’ and ‘generalising spirit’ in check, 
making use of it only when necessary in the circumstances.72 He did not dismiss the 
‘generalising spirit’ outright, noting that it was an important talent for a young lawyer 
to develop,73 nor did he deny that the search for a ‘universal jurisprudence’ could bear 
fruit.74 His point was instead to caution against excessive reliance on a particular 
mode of thought when seeking to understanding and practise law – one that 
prioritized subtle reasoning, generalizations, and abstract and universal principles, 
often at the expense of particular details. 
 In this regard, Hume shared some commonalities with eminent philosophers of 
his age, with whom he shared a bond. His uncle, the philosopher David Hume and 
overseer of his nephew’s education,75 regarded justice, law and government as neither 
purposively designed nor rationally constructed. Instead, they emerged spontaneously 
over time through the course of numerous particular interactions and decisions. This 
was a view broadly shared by Adam Smith, a close friend of the philosopher Hume, 
                                                 
71 In more recent work Cairns has argued that the influence of Millar, Smith, and 
perhaps even Kames can be detected in Hume’s lectures (John W Cairns ‘The Legacy 
of Smith’s Jurisprudence in Late-Eighteenth Century Edinburgh’ (forthcoming)). 
72 G Campbell H Paton (ed), Baron Hume’s Lectures 1786-1822, vol 1 (Stair Society 
1939) 5. 
73 ibid. 
74 ibid 6. 
75 Walker (n 62) 316. 
 17 
with whom he shared many intellectual affinities,76 and Millar, 77 with whom Baron 
Hume studied and lodged whilst a student at the University of Glasgow.78 These 
philosophers differed from Hume in their ambitions to provide a universal 
jurisprudence but they shared with him a regard for particular decisions. As Millar 
explained to his students, ‘writers upon Jurisprudence have commonly taken up too 
much time in general discourses on the foundation of Natural Law and been too 
sparing of illustration by a detail of law cases’, an error that had led them frequently 
to confound ethics with jurisprudence.79 
 Connected to this view of the spontaneous development of law and justice was 
a distrust of over-speculation, at least in respect of thinking about law prospectively 
and how it might develop. Hume’s warning to his students to keep their ‘subtile 
reasoning’ to a minimum and his caution against ‘contracting too great a fondness for 
speculative notions’80 resonate with Smith’s belief that the ‘spirit of system’ was the 
hallmark of intellectual arrogance. Just as Smith believed that the best that could be 
achieved through law and policy was a piecemeal approach to remedying evils,81 
                                                 
76 Donald Winch, ‘Smith, Adam (bap. 1723, d. 1790)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Oct 2007 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/25767]. 
77 Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the 
Scottish Enlightenment (CUP 1996) 163; Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a 
Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (CUP 1989) 
7-21, chs 3 and 4. See generally Craig Smith, ‘The Scottish Enlightenment, 
Unintended Consequences and the Science of Man’ (2009) 7(1) Journal of Scottish 
Philosophy 9. 
78 John W Cairns, ‘Hume, David (bap. 1757, d. 1838)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2007 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/14142]. 
79 John Millar: Course of lectures upon jurisprudence  (student’s notes, 1793) Special 
Collections, University of Glasgow Library, MS Hamilton 117 30. 
80 Paton (n 72) 4. 
81 Haakonssen, Science of a Legislator (n 77) 91-92. 
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Hume believed it was utterly impossible that a ‘uniform and complete theory’ could 
be applied to ‘the manifold transactions of everyday life’.82  
 These deliberations on the relationship between universals and particulars and 
the limits of speculative reasoning are revelatory when it comes to understanding the 
declaratory power. One of the reasons why the power was perceived by Hume to be 
necessary and good was that it could more effectively repress an ‘evil’ in its 
beginnings than could legislation, which was likely to be ‘partial and defective’ in its 
‘description of new offences’.83 Given the perceived deficiencies of legislation 
produced at this time,84 such remarks could be nothing more a slight on the 
Westminster parliament and indeed Hume refers to the multiple English Acts against 
theft to support his argument. Yet he also makes a point of contrasting the ‘testimony 
of experience’ with ‘the fallacious conjectures of human wisdom before the event’, 
concluding that the Scottish regime for repressing crimes gave no reason to envy any 
other part of Europe in that respect.85 It is worth noting that this regard for experience 
did not necessarily imply, or require, reverence for the doctrine of precedent. To 
Smith, for example, while precedent was a valuable curb on judicial arbitrariness,86 it 
was not the antiquity of law that lent it authority; this was supplied by its conformity 
with natural justice.87 There was therefore nothing inherently contradictory about 
valuing the testimony of experience and supporting the declaratory power per se.  
 
                                                 
82 Paton (n 72) 4. 
83 Hume (n 3) lii. 
84 Farmer (n 19). 
85 Hume (n 3) lii. 
86 John W Cairns, ‘Adam Smith and the Role of the Courts in Securing Justice and 
Liberty’ in Robin Paul Malloy and Jerry Evensky Adam Smith and the Philosophy of 
Law and Economics (Kluwer 1994) 31. 
87 Haakonssen, Science of a Legislator (n 77) 132, 153. The idea of natural justice is 
discussed further in Section 4. 
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B. Societal Development and the Mutability of Law 
 
Coexisting with this distaste for excessive innovation in developing the law,88 there 
was an acute awareness of the need for law to develop in parallel with societal change 
and to ensure it could meet the requirements of a commercial nation. During the 
eighteenth century, a number of Scottish philosophers, beginning with Lord Kames 
and including Smith and Millar, adopted a ‘stages’ approach to explaining changes in 
law, presenting a narrative of progress from barbarism to civilization.89 The 
declaratory power, as a mechanism for quashing novel forms of misconduct as they 
arose, clearly coheres with this idea of law responding to the changing circumstances 
and needs of the country. Of course, Hume distanced himself from attempts to 
construct universal accounts of laws’ history and development, and it is possible that 
he did so from a desire to resist the ambition to unify Scots and English law that 
underpinned some of his contemporaries’ efforts.90 He was adamant, however, that 
there was a close association between criminal law and the ‘manners, and temper, and 
way of thinking of the nation’ and that its ‘general spirit…will always, in some 
measure, be bent and accommodated to the temper and exigencies of the times’.91 
 This view of the relationship between law and societal development is 
evidenced in the informations from two of the cases under consideration. In Rachel 
                                                 
88 This applied to legislation too. For Smith and Millar, legislation presupposed a pre-
existing idea of justice and to deviate from this too far, especially in service of 
political speculations, was problematic (Haakonssen Natural Law and Moral 
Philosophy (n 77) 163; Haakonssen Science of a Legislator (n 77) 93, 97). 
89 John W Cairns ‘Legal Theory’ in A Broadie (ed) The Cambridge Companion to the 
Scottish Enlightenment (CUP 2003) 232. 
90 E.g. Lord Kames and John Dalrymple before him (Farmer (n 19) 46; Ian Ross, 
‘Quaffing the “Mixture of Wormwood & Aloes”: A Consideration of Lord Kames’s 
Historical Law-Tracts’ (1967) 8(4) Texas Studies in Literature and Language 499, 
501-502).  
91 Hume (n 3) xxxix. 
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Wright,92 during a post-conviction challenge to the competency of punishing child 
stealing with death, the accused argued that the libel had been irrelevant: since a child 
was not property it could not be stolen. Although there was precedent supporting the 
charge,93 and it was arguably too late to make the challenge, the court ordered 
informations on the matter, in which the prosecutor – Henry Cockburn94 – portrayed 
this conduct as being of greater concern in a society that had advanced from its early 
rude and turbulent times. Of the three forms of non-violent injury to the person he 
identified – enslaving a freeman, unlawful detention and stealing an infant from its 
relations and natural protectors – the last was ‘more natural to a civilized and 
commercial state of society’. It was ‘perpetrated without violence’, ‘persisted without 
any visible guilt’ and could ‘only meet with its reward’ from the ‘refined humanity’ 
of the age.  
 Cockburn had also prepared the prosecution arguments in a case earlier that 
year in which a group of workmen were charged with unlawfully combining or 
striking to raise wages.95 The criminality of such practices was unclear when the case 
came to court.96 Early Acts of the Scottish parliament for regulating wages and the 
conduct of workmen were not used to suppress this sort of behaviour and the 
Westminster Anti-Combination statues of 1799 and 1800 were regarded as 
inapplicable in Scotland.97 In effect, there was nothing to suggest that combinations of 
                                                 
92 23 November 1808 and 25 January 1809 (NRS JC 4/4). 
93 Torrence and Waldie 3 February 1752 (NRS JC 7/28) and Margaret Irvine 24 
September 1784 (NRS JC 11/35). No debate on the relevancy is recorded in either 
case. 
94 Later Lord Cockburn. 
95 James Taylor, James Thomson, William Dawson, John Russell 8 March 1808 (NRS 
JC 4/4). 
96 The status of combinations of workmen at common law and according to statute 
was unclear in England too (see James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal 
Law of England (first published 1833, CUP 2014 vol 3) ch 30). 
97 J L Gray, ‘The Law of Combination in Scotland’ (1928) 24 Economica 332.  
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workmen were criminal under Scots law, in the absence of some other offence such as 
rioting or violence.98 One of the reasons Cockburn advanced for punishing such 
conduct, despite the lack of previous prosecutions, was that the practices had only 
emerged as a menace since Scotland had become a manufacturing nation. The same 
suggestion was made in another combinations case three years later,99 in which 
Joshua Henry Mackenzie, the prosecuting advocate, claimed that it was ‘plain that the 
offence under discussion belongs to an improved period of society’ and that ‘its 
enormity and evil must increase with the improvement of skilled labour, and must be 
of deeper and more dangerous effects in proportion as labour subdivided’.  
 Assuming there was an acknowledged need to repress certain activities, 
however, an equally fundamental question remained: whether it was appropriate for a 
court to intervene. On this point there were mixed views. There was certainly support 
for judicial activism, with Kames, Smith and Millar commending the role of courts as 
agents of legal change,100 but there were opponents too. Even where the court’s power 
to punish new offences was granted, this was sometimes accompanied by doubts as to 
its desirability.101 One source of criticism was a sense of embarrassment that Scotland 
was lagging behind other countries, particularly England, in neglecting to separate out 
the judicial and legislative functions of government fully. This criticism became 
increasingly apparent as the nineteenth century wore on, possibly in response to 
                                                 
98 ibid. As Straka has shown, simple combinations of workmen were considered 
illegal, if not criminal, from the middle of the eighteenth century (W W Straka, ‘The 
Law of Combination in Scotland Reconsidered’ (1985) 64(2) The Scottish Historical 
Review 128). 
99 Francis Orr, Matthew Chambers, John McDonald, George Emory 11 January 1811 
(NRS JC 4/5). 
100 Cairns, ‘Legal Theory’ (n 89) 232-234. 
101 E.g. in Rachel Wright defence counsel (John Reid) suggested that ‘perhaps it 
would have been safer to have followed the example of the sister kingdom in 
withholding from judges every kind of arbitrary or discretionary power’. 
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reproof of judge-made law South of the border.102 Yet according to earlier works of 
Smith and Millar, the emergence of a legislative power as a complement to, and check 
on, judicial powers was the mark of civilized society.103  
 The need for separate legislative and judicial powers is therefore only part of 
the explanation. The more important consideration was how the division of labour 
between courts and the legislature was conceived, and for a number of Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers the division hinged on the distinction between justice and 
expediency. This qualitative distinction, which rested on the nature of the activity 
under consideration rather than the functional distinction between lawmaking and 
law-interpreting, provided the key to determining whether the court or legislature was 
the more appropriate body for imposing sanctions, and it is this distinction that helps 
explain the existence and contours of the declaratory power. 
 
4. Justice, Expediency and Moral Evaluation 
 
A. The Distinction in Theory 
 
In the view of the Scottish philosophers under consideration, a theory of justice was 
part of a broader theory about the nature of moral evaluation. Moral evaluation was 
for some, including Smith and Millar, rooted in the moral sentiments – the feelings of 
approval or disapproval that arose when faced with an action.104 Dugald Stewart, on 
                                                 
102 See n 16 and Cockburn ‘Scottish Criminal Jurisprudence’ (n 1) 216. 
103 Haakonssen Science of a Legislator (n 77) 132, 153, 170; Haakonssen Natural 
Law and Moral Philosophy (n 77) 162. 
104 Amy M Schmitter, ‘Passions, Affections, Sentiments: Taxonomy and 
Terminology’ in Harris (n 60) 197. Millar told his pupils that moral good and evil 
were ultimately distinguished by certain feelings or sentiments, citing Hume and 
mentioning Smith’s system of sympathy as the means by which we establish the 
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the other hand, followed his mentor Thomas Reid in holding that man possessed an 
inherent moral faculty – a complex of reason and feeling – that allowed him to 
perceive the real, immutable moral quality of different actions.105 In spite of this 
important difference,106 these theories shared a couple of common features: they were 
based on the idea of corresponding judgement107 and they regarded moral evaluation 
as instantaneous. According to these philosophers, this latter feature distinguished 
assessments of morality from assessments of utility, for while the moral worth of an 
act struck the senses immediately, its remote tendency, its utility, was a matter for 
philosophical speculation. If anything, an action’s utility merely served to strengthen 
the initial feelings of approval or disapproval.108 As with the other virtues, justice was 
based on the exercise of moral judgment, but it was distinct in its sharpness and 
clarity. This precision made justice amendable to enforcement109 and, more 
specifically, made breaches of justice appropriate targets for punishment.110  
 In light of this association between justice and punishment, it is essential to 
recall that the declaratory power grants the High Court the ability to punish conduct. 
                                                                                                                                           
agreeable standard of human nature (John Millar: Course of lectures upon 
jurisprudence  (student’s notes, 1793) Special Collections, University of Glasgow 
Library, MS Hamilton 117 16, 20, 24). 
105 Haakonssen Natural Law and Moral Philosophy (n 77) 227-229. 
106 Which I return to in Section 5. 
107 Whether through the coincidence of sympathy culminating in an impartial 
spectator or a uniformly held moral sense, this commonly held point of view is 
crucial. 
108 Haakonssen Science of a Legislator (n 77) 72; John Millar: Course of lectures 
upon jurisprudence  (student’s notes, 1793) Special Collections, University of 
Glasgow Library, MS Hamilton 117 21; Dugald Stewart, Outlines of Moral 
Philosophy: For the use of students in the University of Edinburgh (William Creech 
1793) 231. 
109 Haakonssen Science of a Legislator (n 77) 37, 86; MS Hamilton 117, John Millar: 
Course of lectures upon jurisprudence [Student’s notes.] (1793) 27; William Hamilton 
(ed), The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, vol 7 (Thomas Constable & Co 1855) 
255. 
110 Haakonssen Science of a Legislator (n 77) ch 5; Haakonssen Natural Law and 
Moral Philosophy (n 77) 161. 
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Its exercise is thus intimately connected with the realms of justice and the process of 
moral evaluation.111 Hence, for Smith punishment was based on sympathy, and utility 
could only provide a supplementary justification for punishment that strengthened the 
resolve to punish in controversial cases.112 For Millar, too, punishment for crimes was 
warranted on the basis of resentment and reciprocal indignation but also to preserve 
the peace of society, a distinctly utilitarian goal.113 Even Baron Hume, who avoided 
offering a theory of punishment seems to endorse a similar perspective when he states 
that laws should be directed at ‘those crimes which the manners of the age breed a 
direct abhorrence of, or which the present condition of the people renders particularly 
hurtful in their consequences to private or public peace’.114 This was particularly true 
of the criminal law; whereas in the majority of civil cases ‘our moral feelings are 
altogether indifferent’ they ‘never can be on a question of whether a particular action 
or course of conduct is or is not a fit object of punishment’.115 In this, Hume appears 
implicitly to be relying on the same combination of abhorrence, based on moral 
feeling, and harm to the public peace, which animated Millar and Smith’s accounts of 
punishment, which had also underpinned the earlier account of punishment offered by 
Lord Kames.116 
                                                 
111 This point is easily overlooked when the power is described as the power to ‘create 
new crimes’ (Rahmatian (n 65) 309). Where the doctrine of precedent is strictly 
observed, the power renders subsequent incidences of similar conduct punishable and 
in this sense can be considered a form of de facto criminalization, but the distinction 
between punishment, being liable to punishment, and other forms of legal intervention 
should not be forgotten. 
112 Haakonssen Science of a Legislator (n 77) 117-118. 
113 John Millar: Lectures on the Law of Scotland (set of lecture notes taken by 
William Rae, 1790) Special Collections, University of Glasgow Library, MS Gen. 
181/3 451. 
114 Hume (n 3) xxxix.  
115 Hume (n 3) xl. 
116 For Kames, the immorality of an act and its tendency to undermine the peace of 
society were key to enforcing its prohibition (Michael Lobban, ‘The Ambition of 
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 For those writers who discussed the issue, the power to punish injustices was 
located with the judiciary. Smith contrasted the work of courts, which dealt with 
specific cases of injustice, with that of the legislature, who were not so confined. Free 
of these constraints, the legislature could aim at the other great objects of law, namely 
police, revenue and arms.117 The first of these, police laws, aimed to enhance public 
utility118 and could therefore prescribe punishment for conduct that threatened the 
general interests of society although it did not immediately or directly hurt any 
individual, i.e. conduct that was not criminal according to natural justice.119 Since 
these statutes were not restricted to considerations of justice, their creation would 
often involve speculation in the abstract, a very different process than gauging justice 
through spectatorial sympathy in particular cases.120 Following Smith, Millar 
advanced a similar view, according to which the rules of justice were to be 
determined by judges and the rules of police were to be established by the legislature, 
who could extend the law as its utility became increasingly apparent.121 
 To summarize, in punishing conduct that breached the rules of justice, utility 
had a role to play – it was important to prevent social disorder – but its pursuit would 
never be a goal in itself. The maximization of utility was always combined with a 
concern for justice and was, at least for Smith, Millar and Stewart, merely a 
                                                                                                                                           
Lord Kames’s Equity’ in Andrew Lewis and Michael Lobban (eds) Law and History 
(OUP 2004) 112). 
117 Haakonssen Science of a Legislator (n 77) 96 (the law of nations was later added 
to these four categories). 
118 Haakonssen Science of a Legislator (n 77) 97, 120; Haakonssen Natural Law and 
Moral Philosophy (n 77) 252. 
119 Haakonssen Science of a Legislator (n 77) 121-122. 
120 ibid 152. 
121 John Millar: Course of lectures upon jurisprudence  (student’s notes, 1793) Special 
Collections, University of Glasgow Library, MS Hamilton 117 27; Haakonssen 
Natural Law and Moral Philosophy (n 77) 162. Kames also believed that courts were 
entitled to tackle injustice and that acting for the good of society was the province of 
the legislature (Lobban (n 116) 119).   
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supplementary consideration. When the sole aim of punishment was utility this was a 
matter for the legislature, and even then laws were only merited when necessary for 
the continued viability of society.122 According to these theories, if conduct could 
comfortably be described as an infringement of justice – as deplorable according to 
the precise, easily discernible sentiments of the community, or dictates of the moral 
sense – there would be little controversy in the court exercising its power to punish. 
But the farther conduct strayed from this paradigm, and the more it appeared 
punishable on the basis of utility or expediency, the more problematic would be the 
court’s use of its power.123 This distinction can be seen at work in the cases under 
consideration here, in which prosecution and defence counsel tried to frame the 
conduct of the charge as falling on one side of the divide or the other, and where 
criticism of the power was most emphatic when it was considered to violate this 
distinction.  
   
B. The Distinction in Practice 
 
The first case in which the distinction between justice and utility was operationally 
significant is Macintosh v Dempster.124 The pannel, a Member of Parliament, was 
accused of bribing local officials to further his prospects, and though there were 
various statutes for punishing election-related corruption, the libel against him was 
                                                 
122 Haakonssen Science of a Legislator (n 77) 122. 
123 Bentham’s proposals to found morals and legislation on utility and his rejection of 
the principle of sympathy (indeed utilitarianism more broadly) were received poorly 
in the Edinburgh Review. This was for various reasons, from their dismissal of 
sentiments and the testimony of good conscience to their banality see e.g. ‘Bentham, 
Traités sur les Principes de Legislation Civile et Penale’ (1804) Edinburgh Review 1; 
T B Macauley ‘Mill’s Essay on Government’ (1829) 49 Edinburgh Review 159; J 
Sortain, ‘Bentham’s Science of Morality’ (1835) 61 Edinburgh Review 365. 
124 26 November 1767 (NRS JC 3/35). 
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founded, very generally, on the ‘Law of the Realm’. The prosecutor, Alexander 
Wight, maintained that this broad libel encompassed the relevant legislation, but 
counsel for the accused, Henry Dundas,125 maintained it was essential to specify a 
particular statute; while vagueness of this kind might have been tolerable in the past it 
was, in his view, now unacceptable. Further reflecting shifting notions of authority, he 
argued that Roman law was no longer an appropriate source to rely on in criminal 
cases.  
 The advocates were similarly divided on whether the conduct was a crime at 
common law – a point that was significant since the statutes were not clearly 
applicable. Relying on an argument similar to that made in Thomas Gray, Wight 
contended that crimes without precedent might be punished at common law, since this 
was how various now-established offences had first been proscribed. Dundas rejected 
this view, arguing that in more advanced times it was incumbent on the legislature to 
intervene. Importantly, however, this was not because the courts were incapable of 
punishing new offences but because whereas early common law crimes had been 
‘clear violations of the Law of Nature, or of moral rectitude’, more recent 
prohibitions, especially those already targetted by the legislature, were ‘political 
Evil[s]’.  
 Although it was inappropriate for judges to ‘create political offences’ ‘merely 
from their own notions of Expediency’, this left open the possibility that they might, 
without precedent, punish conduct that was sufficiently iniquitous. This explains why 
it was important for Dundas to refute the prosecutor’s assertion that electoral bribery 
                                                 
125 Educated at the University of Edinburgh before being called to the Bar in 1763, 
Dundas was socially and politically highly influential in Enlightenment Scotland 
(Michael Fry, ‘Dundas, Henry, first Viscount Melville (1742–1811)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 
2009 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/8250]).     
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was a crime at common law on account of its ‘Immorality and evil Tendency’. He did 
so by challenging the alleged ‘Turpitude and Immorality’ of the conduct, 
‘independent of that Inexpediency which has weighed down…Legislature to restrain 
it by such a variety of statutes’. According to Dundas, unlike bribing judges, which 
was a ‘Creature of Injustice’, electoral bribery did not violate morality or the law of 
nature and thus required ‘positive Law to make it criminal…upon reasons of 
Expediency’. In an attempt to comprehensively dispel the suggestion that the court 
might justifiably regard the conduct to be criminal, Dundas argued that even if 
electoral bribery could be considered immoral on account of its ‘Expediency and 
destructive Tendency’, some immoralities were purely a matter of conscience. This 
contention was in keeping the distinction between law and ethics that was observed 
by the Enlightenment philosophers.126 
 Two decades later, similar questions arose in James Stein,127 where the 
accused was charged with bribing a revenue officer. Again, there were statutes for 
punishing various offences against the revenue, but none clearly applied. As such, the 
prosecutor, Ilay Campbell, tried to argue that all bribery was criminal at common law, 
asserting that: 
 
Common law is founded in the principles of Common reason and treats of 
common right and wrong, and it must be plain to the understanding of every 
man that to corrupt those who one employed in offices of public trust…is a 
                                                 
126 The libel was held relevant but too factually imprecise to be put to an assize. From 
Maclaurin’s self-confessedly ‘very imperfect’ notes, it appears the judges merely 
stated that the conduct was criminal at common law without giving reasons (John 
Maclaurin, Arguments and decisions in remarkable cases, before the High Court of 
Justiciary, and other supreme courts in Scotland (J Bell and E & C Dilly 1774) 425 
ff).  
127 2 October and 5 December 1786 (NRS JC 3/44). 
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crime of an heinous nature, and which therefore at common law must be the 
subject of prosecution. 
 
Bribery, he added, was ‘evidently a moral wrong’ and could be contrasted with 
statutory offences such as usury or smuggling. Whereas it was doubtful whether one 
could ‘discover from the light of reason alone’ any impropriety in charging interest on 
money or importing spirits in contravention of revenue statutes, ‘every man’s 
Conscience must teach him that Bribing an officer of the Public…is an act of inherent 
turpitude, which by the Common principles of right and wrong must be punishable 
everywhere as a Crime’.  The clear and universally accessible wrongfulness of this 
conduct meant that it could be punished without ‘express law or Statute…nor any 
series of judges [sic] cases’ and the additional injurious consequences of the 
behaviour merely strengthened the case for bringing the prosecution. 
 At the time these informations were prepared, Campbell had links with the 
University of Glasgow: he was made Doctor of Laws in 1784 and later became the 
University’s rector.128 It was a period in which Smithian jurisprudence was thriving in 
the University129 before which Reid had spent several years occupying the Chair of 
Moral Philosophy,130 and signs of both men’s schools of thought are evident in 
Campbell’s arguments.131 His claims about the clarity, immediacy and universality of 
                                                 
128 From 1799-1801 (Michael Fry, ‘Campbell, Sir Ilay, of Succoth, first baronet 
(1734–1823)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 
2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/4504]). 
129 Millar, who was Regius Professor of Civil Law from 1761 to 1800, was heavily 
influenced by Smith in his lectures and writing (‘Craig’s Life of Millar’ (1806) 9 
Edinburgh Review 83, 84). 
130 From 1764-1780 (Paul Wood, ‘Reid, Thomas (1710–1796)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Oct 2006 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/23342]). 
131 The informations prepared by Campbell in the earlier case of HM Adv v Calum 
MacGregor alias John Grant 30 July and 3 August 1773 (NRS JC 3/38) hark back to 
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the principles of right and wrong replicate Reid’s moral realism132 and their capacity 
to be known through conscience and the use of reason tally with Reid’s beliefs about 
man’s active powers.133 As for the Smithian dimension, this comes out in the contrast 
between statutory offences, which are said to lack intrinsic iniquity, and the purported 
common law offence at hand.  
 Smith’s influence was even clearer in the response of the defence advocate. 
Challenging the court’s authority to punish, Henry Erskine, who was educated at the 
University of Glasgow while Reid and Millar occupied their respective chairs,134 
relied on a taxonomy of crimes that reflects very clearly Smith’s account of justice, 
punishment and police powers. Accordingly, the first category of crime comprised 
those ‘transgressions against the State or the life, limb or property of our neighbours’ 
which, in addition to ‘their own immorality’ ‘strike so strongly at the existence of 
Society that they are necessarily punished in the rudest States, even before the idea of 
any written law…has been recognised’. According to Erskine, as society improved, 
new crimes, also full of turpitude could ‘excite sufficient resentment or threaten so 
much danger, as to be the object of punishment…by the Common consent of the 
Society without any special enactment’.  
 This connotes the idea of crime as an infraction against natural justice – the 
combination of immorality and danger to society described by Smith and Millar. The 
                                                                                                                                           
earlier conceptions of natural law, as set out by writers on the law of Nature and 
Nations.  
132 Cockburn employed similar arguments in Rachel Wright to determine not only the 
criminality of the conduct but also its appropriate label. He described the offence as 
‘notoriously and universally known by the name of theft’ and the conduct as 
appearing ‘to most people, the first time they perceive it, wonderfully like theft’. 
133 See Sabine Roeser, ‘Reid and Moral Emotions’ (2009) 7(2) The Journal of 
Scottish Philosophy 177. 
134 He commenced his Glasgow studies in 1764, before attending the University of 
Edinburgh in 1766, where he was taught by Adam Ferguson (Michael Fry, ‘Erskine, 
Henry (1746-1817)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University 
Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/8858]). 
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second category of crime was ‘leviora mala in se’.135 Offences in this category were 
not punishable at common law but could be the ‘object[s] of Statutory correction’ in 
virtue of the ‘bad consequences that follow from them to Society’. In other words, 
when the immorality of conduct was small but its impact on society was negative, 
legislative repression was more appropriate than common law punishment. A third 
category of crime included acts that were mala in se but were not punished by 
common law or statute because of their ‘small degree of criminality’ or ‘difficulty in 
making them the subject of judicial discussion’. These were ‘offences against the 
moral sense’ but punishable only by ‘the operation of conscience’. This category 
gestures towards the aforementioned distinction between law and ethics, an 
interpretation supported by the examples offered of ingratitude, lying and 
dissoluteness of manners. The final species of crime was acts ‘indifferent in 
themselves’ that were insufficiently depraved to be the ‘just objects of punishment’, 
but which could be ‘made punishable’ by the ‘force of Statute’ in order to ‘attain or 
enforce some end of Government, some regulation of police, or some object of 
Revenue’. The correlation between this last category and Smith’s division of laws is 
obvious and the distinction between ‘just punishment’ and acts being ‘made 
punishable’ is significant. Noting the case of McIvor v Dempster, Erskine accepted 
that bribery was a crime at common law, but he disputed that the conduct libelled fell 
within its remit, instead characterizing it as belonging to the third or fourth category 
of offences.136 
 Turning back to the cases involving combinations of workmen, these indicate 
reliance on a shared set of ideas about justice and utility, used in different ways with 
                                                 
135 Of lighter evil in itself. 
136 The court found the indictment relevant but in the absence of recorded reasoning it 
is not clear on what ground. 
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different outcomes. In the first of these cases, 137 Cockburn argued for the prosecution 
that any injury done to the public intentionally was a crime at common law. This was 
to push the boundaries of the court’s powers beyond those envisaged by the 
Enlightenment philosophers, for the requirement of wrongfulness or injustice is 
absent. Indeed, Cockburn went so far as to claim that the law was intended to promote 
the good of the people ‘solely under the operation of the same principle of utility, 
which changes, according to circumstances, our views of the expediency or 
hurtfulness, and consequently the innocence or criminality, of actions’. He was 
careful to point out that a suspicion of prejudice to the community was insufficient to 
warrant the court’s punishment, this being something for politicians to detect and the 
legislature to denounce, but he suggested that the court’s jurisdiction should not be 
limited to simple cases of moral enormity. Unless it extended to more complex 
scenarios, crimes ‘perhaps equally profligate, and certainly a thousand times more 
ruinous to society must escape from punishment, under the mere protection of their 
intricacy, or the apparent remoteness of their consequences’. Put differently, 
Cockburn was attempting to stretch the court’s jurisdiction beyond the realm of 
justice and into the realm of pure utility. 
 This attempt was unsuccessful, though the judges recognized the power of the 
High Court to take cognizance of new crimes. According to the majority of the court, 
the conduct did not ‘infer that degree of moral turpitude and depravity, or malignity, it 
[sic] renders that relevant for the jurisdiction of this court at common law’.138  
                                                 
137 James Taylor, James Thomson, William Dawson, John Russell 8 March 1808 
(NRS JC 4/4). 
138 Lord Craig (Judgments recounted in Hutcheson’s Treatise on the Offices of Justice 
of Peace, etc, in Scotland, as excerpted in First Report from Select Committee on 
Artizans and Machinery (1824), Appendix A). See also Hume’s account of this case, 
which states that the majority held that while such combinations could be the proper 
subject of civil damages or redress, they did not ‘imply that degree of baseness or 
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 Three years later, Joshua Henry Mackenzie,139 counsel for the prosecution in 
the second combinations case to come before the High Court, 140 adopted a different 
approach. He argued that a crime was an act that was mischievous to society, but 
added that the mischief must not be very ‘remote or recondite’ – it should be such that 
‘ordinary men’, if ‘anxious to avoid injury’ to others, could abstain from doing so. 
Importantly, he equated this idea of damage to society to a moral wrong. In his words, 
‘if an action be mischievous and manifestly mischievous to society, it must be 
immoral, unless moral sentiment be very grievously perverted, which in this country 
will not be pretended’. A further qualification was that, to be a crime at common law, 
the act must be capable of being punished, as distinct from the ‘imperfect obligations 
or duties’ that were matters of morality but not law.  
 In making these arguments Mackenzie portrayed the workmen’s actions as 
fitting squarely within the parameters of the court’s powers, according to prevailing 
philosophical opinion. In response, Cockburn, who was appearing for the defence this 
time, tried to argue that combinations of workmen did not fit this mould. He agreed 
that the criminal law was based on the ‘dictates of conscience and simple reason’ and 
stated that, where extension was necessary, this would never become ‘so deep, 
complicated or extensive that the voice of nature will not always be heard, approving 
of the use which has been made of her original suggestions’. Conduct that was fit to 
be declared ‘undoubtedly criminal’ was that which ‘the head and hearts of any 
                                                                                                                                           
depravity…which were essential…to the notion of an indictable crime’ (Hume (n 48) 
494). 
139 Eldest son of the lawyer and celebrated novelist Henry Mackenzie, author of The 
Man of Feeling, whose work has suggested links with Scottish sentimentalist 
philosophy (Harold William Thompson, A Scottish Man of Feeling (OUP 1931) 180, 
chs 1 and 4). 
140 Francis Orr, Matthew Chambers, John McDonald, George Emory 11 January 
1811 (NRS JC 4/5). 
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ordinary man would…after a very little reflection, from the mere impulse of common 
sense and feeling, pronounce to be criminal’.  
 It is significant that Cockburn was educated by, and a great admirer of, Dugald 
Stewart, for his references to reason, conscience and the impulse of common sense 
chime with Stewart’s teachings, which followed those of Reid.141 Drawing on these 
philosophical notions of morality and justice, he contrasted the case against 
workmen’s combinations as being founded on political speculation. Unfortunately, 
only the outcome and not the substance of the judges’ reasoning is recorded but this 
indicates that they were more favourably disposed to the prosecution, holding that 
relevant material might be selected to infer criminal punishment but that the charges 
lacked the clearness, precision and simplicity that was necessary for criminal 
accusation and jury trial.142 
 Eventually, by a decision in 1813, the libel of mere combination was held to 
be a crime.143 The libel was similar to that in Taylor but limited information exists to 
explain why it was held relevant.144 One suggestion is that Lords Craig and Cullen, 
who had held the charge in Taylor to be irrelevant, had by this time quit the Bench.145 
Broader economic and political pressures, including industrial unrest, are also thought 
                                                 
141 Henry Cockburn, Memorials of His Time (D Appleton & Company 1856) 26-31. 
Cockburn expressed similar sentiments about the admissibility of evidence, arguing 
that some rules of proof were arbitrary and relative but others ‘depend upon more 
fixed and universal dictates of reason’. The merit of these rules would depend on how 
closely they ‘coincide with, or are repugnant to, the opinions of ordinary men, in 
ordinary affairs’ (H Cockburn, ‘Jury Trial in Scotland, Improved, by being Extended: 
A Letter to the Lord Chancellor’ (1833) 57 Edinburgh Review 96). 
142 As Hume commented, ‘the terms of this interlocutor were such as gave reason to 
believe, that, upon a libel not subject to the same exceptions, the Bench might be 
disposed to depart from the precedent in the case of Taylor’ (Hume (n 48) 495).  
143 William Mackimmie & others, 12 and 13 March 1813 (Hume (n 48) 495)). One 
explanation for this change was that Lords Craig and Cullen, who had held the charge 
in Taylor to be irrelevant, had quit the Bench (Gray (n 69) 342). 
144 No objections to the relevancy were made and no informations ordered (NRS JC 
8/9). There is no record of the judges’ reasoning. 
145 Gray (n 69) 342. 
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to have played a role.146 The decision was met with some criticism,147 and when the 
parameters of the crime were called into question a few years later,148 the defence 
advocate, Cockburn, continued to refer to it as an ‘artificial offence’. Warning the 
Court not to expand its limits, he cautioned that ‘it is not one of those simple crimes 
which cannot be committed without exciting in the breast, both of the criminal and the 
spectator, an instinctive & decided consciousness of its guilt’. This was conduct 
whose effects were extremely difficult to discern and predict, whose prohibition in 
previous years had set the court ‘afloat…in a sea of mere speculation’. It would be 
‘infinitely better’, in his opinion, if ‘our criminal law books, instead of being loaded 
with reasonings which belong to the legislature alone had been allowed to retain some 
of their obvious morality and primitive plainness’. The prosecutor, Alexander 
Maconochie, condemned the impertinence of these comments, which insinuated that 
the judges’ previous opinions were ‘destitute of morality and simplicity’. Maintaining 
that the case at hand (which involved the mere threat to strike) involved no extension 
of the law, he invited their Lordships to sanction the judgment of their predecessors, 
which he described as ‘neither unjust nor inexpedient’.149 
 Just six years later, by a statute of 1824, mere combination ceased to be a 
crime.150 The ethos behind the legislation has been described as Benthamite 
                                                 
146 ibid 348; Straka (n 98). 
147 E.g. J R McCulloch ‘Combination Laws’ (1824) 39 Edinburgh Review 315, which 
criticized the laws against voluntary combinations on grounds ‘both of justice and 
utility’, and questioned the ability of a court to determine the expediency of delicate 
principles of commercial policy (331, 336-340).   
148 Wilson & Banks 10 January 1818 (NRS JC 4/9). 
149 The indictment was held relevant but the prosecutor judged it to be against the 
public interest to continue the trial (First Report from Select Committee on Artizans 
and Machinery (1824), Appendix A1 499). 
150 Gray (n 69) 345-346. See also John V Orth, ‘English Combination Acts of the 
Eighteenth Century’ (1987) 5 Law and History Review 175. A number of acts relating 
to combinations of workmen amounted to criminal offences, however, and the 
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individualism,151 and concerns over the law’s efficacy and its tendency to exacerbate 
disagreements between workmen and workers also go towards explaining its 
repeal.152 In practice, the charge of simple combination had scarcely been used in 
Scotland,153 but the abrupt change was used by Cockburn to demonstrate the problems 
of judicial lawmaking. In an embarrassingly short period of time practices the courts 
had deemed dangerous had been determined by the legislature to be beneficial.154 
Cockburn referred to this unsuccessful foray into the domain of pure expediency in 
subsequent cases, counselling the court to beware of ‘meddling with questions of 
expediency’ and reminding them to ‘employ those judicial lights which disclose laws 
that already exist’ lest they stray into the realms of speculation, usurping the role of 
the legislature.155 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Cockburn’s castigation effectively conflates two things: the power of the court to 
speculate on matters of what we might now call public policy and the power of the 
court to take cognizance of new crimes, and from this point on these critiques have 
frequently been run together. This is unsurprising, given that the frequently cited case 
                                                                                                                                           
common law of conspiracy with regard to trade union action survived (see Stephen (n 
96) 208-222). 
151 A V Dicey, ‘The Combination Laws as Illustrating the Relation Between Law and 
Opinion in England during the Nineteenth-Century’ (1904) 17(8) Harv LR 511, 519-
522. 
152 See ‘Resolutions of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the 
Combination Laws, 21 May 1824 (Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, New Series, 
XI, 811-813)’ in A Aspinall et al (eds) English Historical Documents 1783-1832 
(Routledge 1959) 865. 
153 First Report from Select Committee on Artizans and Machinery (1824) 487. 
154 Cockburn ‘Scottish Criminal Jurisprudence’ (n 1) 219. 
155 James Craw 4 June 1827 (NRS JC 4/17). 
 37 
of Bernard Greenhuff, which confirmed the existence of the declaratory power,156 is 
equally renowned for the emphatic dissent of Lord Cockburn. Though Cockburn 
accepted that the court might deal with old crimes committed in a new way and 
conduct falling within the spirit of a previous decision or established general 
principle, he denied that the court could create offences on the basis of implied 
wickedness and hurtfulness.157   
 It is possible that Cockburn’s unsuccessful appearances in the combination 
cases contributed towards his dissent, but it is clear that he was not alone in 
harbouring, or at least recognizing, discomfort over use of the declaratory power. For 
example, Lord Meadowbank, wrote that ‘whatever individual opinions may be 
entertained as to the propriety’ of the Court’s power, the law should not be altered 
after being so ‘deliberately settled’.158 Similarly, Lord Moncreiff was unwilling to 
rely much on the combination cases, on account of the judges’ differing opinions and 
the speed with which the law had been superseded, but he accepted that they affirmed 
the Court’s power.159 For his part, Lord Mackenzie confessed to feeling doubts about 
the case at hand but stated that he could not ‘discard the power’, adding that it was 
‘too late for me now to entertain any doubts, that we must sustain a jurisdiction of this 
nature, as inherent in this Court’.160   
 In some ways it is easy to accept this shift of opinion as a natural 
development. The nineteenth century marked a sharp rise in the criminal law’s 
regulatory function, and increased moral pluralism and cultural diversity threw doubt 
on the notion that a shared perception of wrongfulness could exist, even in cases of 
                                                 
156 The Court held that it was an offence to open and keep a common gaming house, 
despite the absence of applicable statute or precedent. 
157 Greenhuff (n 34) 274. 
158 ibid 263-264. 
159 ibid 265. 
160 ibid 268. 
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alleged injustice.161 Indeed, at a more general level, the process by which the 
declaratory power lost favour reflects the decline of foundational thinking. In the 
modern age, widespread socio-historical contextualization of law has worked to 
demolish its purported atemporal foundations and alleged autonomy, leading to the 
tendency to see law as wholly reducible to (often illegitimate) politics. As Parker has 
argued, ‘the emergence of this particular law-politics problem…transcends the 
American politico- legal context, going more generally to philosophical concerns 
about the status of foundational thinking after modernism’. In a world that appears 
‘“ever provisional”’, 162 politics takes the place of metaphysics.  
 If law is regarded as nothing more than politics it is difficult to maintain the 
divide between laws of justice and other forms of legal regulation that underpinned 
the early uses of the declaratory power. Relatedly, the claim that only the latter 
involves the kind of speculation163 that courts are ill-suited to perform is more 
difficult to sustain. If acts of injustice and administrative crimes are both regarded as 
politically contestable forms of offending then contemporary criticisms of the power 
can easily appear natural and justified. Yet while these criticisms demonstrate that the 
type of thinking that prevailed during the emergence of the declaratory power no 
longer enjoys the same prominence, they do not establish that either way of thinking 
is inherently superior or meritorious. Even acknowledging the difficulty, though not 
                                                 
161 Nicola Lacey ‘What Constitutes Criminal Law’ in R A Duff et al, The Constitution 
of Criminal Law (OUP 2013) 14.  
162 Kunal M Parker, ‘Law In and As History: The Common Law in the American 
Polity, 1790-1900’ (2011) 1 University of California Irvine Law Review 587, 607-
608, quoting Benjamin Barber.  
163 In either sense that the term was used pejoratively, i.e. to refer to abstract, a priori 
reasoning or to refer to empirical reasoning as to the long term consequences – the 
utility or disutility – of policies or modes of conduct. 
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impossibility, 164 of sustaining foundational thinking in the modern age, there are 
alternative ways of rendering the declaratory power, and the flexibility of Scots 
criminal law more broadly, comprehensible and potentially justifiable.  
 The first of these takes account of one important difference between some of 
the more recent declaratory-style cases and the early discussions of the declaratory 
power outlined above. In contrast to the early writers and advocates, who readily 
appealed to a sense of justice that was beyond posited law, the general principles 
relied upon in more recent cases, which follow Cockburn’s distinction, come from 
within the legal system. These can be very general, ranging from ‘wickedness’ and the 
‘deceptive invasion of the rights of others’,165 to ‘deceit that injures and violates the 
rights of another’.166 In a similar vein, the court has held that acts that cause ‘real 
injury’ are criminal ‘whatever their nature may be’.167  
 This reliance on broad, general principles is seen as entirely unsuitable by 
some. As Christie expresses it, ‘[n]o Scottish court would now decide that particular 
conduct should be criminal on “general principles” or because that conduct was 
deemed wrong or hurtful’. Although ‘it remains legitimately possible for the High 
                                                 
164 As Helmholz has argued, although natural law is no longer dominant a 
distinguished minority of scholars promote its continued recognition (R H Helmholz, 
Natural Law in Court (Harvard University Press 2015).  
165 Qualities that falsely swearing an oath was said to share with perjury. Lord 
Cockburn described it as involving the same ‘obstruction and contamination of legal 
proceedings, by the solemn asseveration of falsehood’ (John Barr (1839) 2 Swin 282, 
317). According to Lord Mackenzie, it was an offence ‘of the same nature’ as perjury, 
‘containing the same falsehood…injury to man, and…contempt for Almighty God’. 
The ‘same principle of law’ could be used to punish the offence, therefore (311). 
166 William Fraser (1847) Ark 280, 312 (Lord Cockburn). The majority of the court 
held that the conduct alleged – impersonating a woman’s husband in order to have sex 
with her –was not rape but that it merited censure, being described by Lord Medwyn 
as ‘sufficiently odious’ and of ‘extreme atrocity’ (307). 
167 Khaliq v HM Adv 1984 JC 23, 32 (Lord Justice General Emslie). The accused was 
charged with selling solvents (glue) and containers (crisp packets, tins and bags) to 
children for the alleged purpose, and in the knowledge, that the children would inhale 
the solvents. 
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Court of Justiciary to discover common law crimes of whose presence even the 
general legal community had not been especially aware’, this is limited to cases 
‘where such crimes have their source in prior authority’.168 These comments suggest 
two things: that general principles do not constitute prior authority and that they are 
unsuitable fodder for adjudication. To that extent, even though these general 
principles are drawn from within the legal system, their acceptance as a valid source 
of law, that judges might rely upon, demands that law be considered to encompass 
more than statutes and decisions of previous cases.  
 As Beever’s own examination of general principles has shown, there are good 
reasons to subscribe to such a view, not least that it helps make sense of many 
instances of common law development.169 Furthermore, reliance on general principles 
accords with the theories of adjudication advocated by leading contemporary 
theorists. Allan, for example, has developed a modified version of Dworkin’s account 
of legal interpretation, according to which judges ought to adhere faithfully to the first 
principles of the legal order in question – its larger scheme of just governance.170 
MacCormick, too, placed considerable importance on general principles, which were 
internal to the legal system, in his account of legitimate judicial lawmaking. He saw 
them as a source from which to develop, and extend, the law in an ‘interstitial’ 
                                                 
168 M G A Christie, ‘Criminal Law’ (n 4) para 15. 
169 Beever (n 14). 
170 Allan suggests that the protection of fundamental rights is a condition of legitimate 
political authority in a liberal-democratic order (T R S Allan, ‘Interpretation, Injustice 
and Integrity’ (2016) 36(1) OJLS 58). 
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manner.171 On these views, declaratory-style cases that purport to draw on general, 
legal principles may be considered entirely justifiable.172   
 The second way the declaratory power can make sense in a post-foundational 
age relies on another theme that has continued from the early cases into the more 
recent ones: the need to alter the common law to respond to changes in society. For 
example, in response to a disputed charge of unauthorized taking and temporary 
retention of another’s property, which related to an alleged incident of joyriding, Lord 
Justice Clerk Alness remarked that he was ‘satisfied that our common law is not so 
powerless as to be unable to afford a remedy’, adding that ‘[i]t would be very 
unfortunate if that [such conduct being permissible] were the state of the law’.173 
Eight years later, the court used its ‘inherent power’ to reverse an earlier decision,174 
which applied vicennial prescription to criminal prosecutions, in order to meet the 
requirements of justice. According to the Lord Justice Clerk (Aitchison), the changed 
spirit of the times was one of the reasons the rule should be abrogated.175 To allow a 
notorious crime that was committed twenty years prior to go unpunished would be 
‘against the public conscience, and contrary to the community sense of what is just, 
upon which the law and respect for the law must ultimately be based’.176  
                                                 
171 When there are persuasive evaluative (including consequentialist) reasons to 
favour the law’s development and no countervailing reasons shown (Neil 
MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Clarendon Press 1994) ch 7). 
172 It is not clear that the Scottish cases would in fact satisfy either of these theories of 
legitimate judicial lawmaking, either because the general principles are not 
sufficiently precise or the degree of uncertainty undermines some fundamental right – 
fair warning, for example. 
173 Strathern v Seaforth 1926 JC 100, 102. 
174 HM Adv v Calum MacGregor (see n 131). 
175 Sugden v HM Adv 1934 JC 103, 110. Two of the other judges refused to recognize 
the earlier court’s decision because it lacked precedent (Lord Anderson (124) and 
Lord Blackburn (125)). 
176 Ibid 110. 
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 These assertions posit a strong link between the community, its sentiments and 
the law – a conception of judicial lawmaking that draws support from beyond posited 
law but does not rely on atemporal or universal claims to authority. Similarly, the 
notion that non-consensual sex with a sleeping woman might go unpunished was 
described by the court as ‘too repugnant, not only to our moral nature, but to the 
plainest principles of our criminal jurisprudence, to be for a moment entertained’.177 
Perhaps most (in)famously, in 1989 the High Court determined that the status of 
women had changed such that it was no longer appropriate that there should exist a 
marital immunity, assuming one existed, from prosecution for rape.178  
Transformations in the rights of women and their place in society provided the 
High Court with further (alleged) justification to radically reform the law of rape 
twelve years later, when it re-defined the offence around the concept of consent.179 
According to Lord Cullen, ‘[t]he criminal law exists in order to protect commonly 
accepted values against socially unacceptable conduct’.180 To reflect these commonly 
accepted values the law would have to be flexible, for ‘a live system of law should 
take account of contemporary attitudes and mores…a live system of law should be 
responsive to changing circumstances’.181  
 This way of conceiving of the common law’s development is markedly 
different from the view that endorses reliance on general legal principles. It is also, in 
                                                 
177 Charles Sweenie (1858) 3 Irvine 109, 145 (Lord Deas). This conduct did not 
satisfy the definition of rape, as the court understood it, at the time. 
178 S v HM Adv 1989 SLT 469. There was some doubt over the origins and extent of 
the rule, as set down by Hume, but the court was clear that its decision to reject the 
rule was based on changed status of women (473). 
179 Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 1 of 2001) 2002 SLT 466, overruling Sweenie. 
180 ibid 475. 
181 ibid cf Lord McCluskey (490). Chalmers, amongst others, was critical of this 
decision, commenting that it was inappropriate for the High Court to undertake such 
major legal reform as it had not, and was unable to, consult on important matters of 
policy (James Chalmers, ‘How (Not) to Reform the Law of Rape’ (2002) 6 ELR 388, 
394-395). 
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an age of atrophied belief in the idea that law incorporates a sense of justice derived 
from beyond the legal system, less plausibly described as representing a declaratory 
theory of law. Rather, to borrow two categories developed by Priel,182 reliance on 
general principles can be described as embodying a practice-based model of authority, 
whereas altering the law to meet the needs and mores of society coheres with a 
custom-based model of authority. According to the practice view of common law, to 
which English law adheres, there is no need to appeal for justification to sources 
outside of law: although public policy has a small role to play, the law’s development 
is governed by legal authorities.183 By contrast, according to the custom view of 
common law, which blossomed in America,184 a close association with the prevailing 
norms of the community is what justifies the law. Correspondingly, the law’s 
authority is rooted in its capacity to reflect a society’s contemporaneous norms, and 
this connection is thought to assuage shortcomings such as lack of notice, poor 
promulgation and alleged retroactivity. Adopting the custom view of common law, 
when judge-made law reflects a society’s accepted norms it is less problematic, 
irrespective of whether those judges are elected.185     
                                                 
182 Priel (n 18). 
183 ibid 16-21. Of course, describing reliance on legal principles as representing a 
practice-based view of authority depends on their being considered legal authorities.   
184 The connections between American and Scottish legal history here are intriguing. 
On the link between Scottish Enlightenment philosophy and early American 
statesmen and constitutional law see, inter alia, Arnaud B Leavelle, ‘James Wilson 
and the Relation of the Scottish Metaphysics to American Political Thought’ (1942) 
57(3) PSQ 384; Samuel Fleischacker, ‘Adam Smith’s Reception among the American 
Founders, 1776-1790’ (2002) 59(4) William and Mary Quarterly 897; James E 
Pfander and Daniel D Birk ‘Article III and the Scottish Judiciary’ (2011) 124 (7) Harv 
LR 1613. 
185 Priel (n 18) 22-24. Having institutional arrangements that support this link between 
the community and judges (such as their election) of course lends weight to custom-
based claims of legitimacy. 
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 Taking account of these two models of common law authority, it is clear that 
the contemporary declaratory-style cases186 manifest a commitment to two different 
ways of thinking about judicial lawmaking and its justification. That this should be so 
can be explained, I would suggest, by the increasing convergence between Scots and 
English law during the nineteenth century, but also by the complex role of history and 
its place in Scottish Enlightenment thought, especially that of Smith and Hume. 
Unlike other Scottish Enlightenment philosophers who considered justice to be rooted 
in universal and stable conceptions of right and wrong,187 for Smith and Hume justice 
was historically contingent and depended on the constitution of a society at a 
particular time and place. This did not mean that justice was entirely relative, 
however. The moral sentiments provided the basis for natural justice, which itself 
provided a benchmark against which to assess posited laws. The reason history was 
important was that it gave greater insight into the substance of natural justice.188 It did 
not, of itself, supply either justice or law with authority. The same is true of the 
significance Smith ascribed to judges. He considered it appropriate for the judiciary to 
develop the law because it was the embodiment of the impartial spectator and thus 
provided the best measure of justice, as derived from community sentiment.189 Its 
authority stemmed from these factors, rather than because it constituted an elite body 
with an enhanced understanding of legal materials, as per the practice model of 
                                                 
186 There have been occasions where the court has refused to extend the boundaries of 
the criminal law, offering reasons including a desire to avoid opining on matters of 
public policy (HMA v Semple 1937 JC 41) and a more general concern with observing 
the separation of powers (Quinn v Cunningham 1956 JC 22; Grant v Allan 1987 JC 
71). 
187 E.g. Reid (George Bragues, ‘David Hume vs. Thomas Reid: Is Justice Socially 
Constructed or Natural?’ (2008) 25(2) History of Philosophy Quarterly 137) and 
Stewart (Haakonssen Natural Law and Moral Philosophy (n 77) ch 7). This 
conception of justice comes out in some of the early declaratory power arguments, as 
discussed in Section 4. 
188 Haakonssen, Science of a Legislator (n 77) 43, 153. 
189 ibid 137. 
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common law authority.  In the view of the Enlightenment philosophers, practice and 
custom were thus bound together in complex ways, which have tended to come apart 
only in the modern age. 
 This analysis sheds significant light not only on how and why the declaratory 
power made sense at the time of its emergence but also on why much of its 
contemporary criticism is misguided. For the most part, this criticism is founded on 
one of several views of legitimacy – the one Priel has dubbed the practice view – 
which is, to an extent, alien to the Scottish intellectual and legal tradition. This key 
point is missed if one remains ignorant of the history of the power but also if one is 
unaware of its philosophical context.  
 More generally, this study underscores the vital importance of being attuned to 
mismatches between critical and explanatory conceptions of law and legitimacy. As 
Dubber has argued, for critical analysis to acquire any force it must operate with a 
theory of legitimacy that is grounded in the relevant state of affairs – in the case of 
law, he argues, this must emerge from an analysis of laws and the legal system 
itself.190 This is undoubtedly correct, but underplays the essential role of cultural and 
intellectual history. As Ibbeston has remarked, ‘[l]awyers accustomed to identifying 
legal rules by reference to statutes and decided cases can all too often slip into 
overlooking the sources from which the statutes and cases themselves derived the 
rules’.191 What is true of substantive laws is equally true of the standards with which 
we critique them: ‘the horizontal connections between different institutions at the 
                                                 
190 Markus D Dubber, ‘New Historical Jurisprudence: Legal History as Critical 
Analysis of Law’ (2015) 2(1) Critical Analysis of Law 1. 
191 D J Ibbetson, ‘Natural Law and Common Law’ 2001 (5) Edin LR 4, 7. 
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same time…can often be of more importance than what appear to be the internal 
dynamics of particular areas of law…We ignore them at our peril’.192     
 
                                                 
192 ibid 20. 
